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Looking at three main European countries, that is France, Germany and Italy, we
provide strong evidence that underpricing related to initial public o⁄erings (IPOs)
is a⁄ected by the distance between the issuing ￿rm and the ￿nancial centre of the
country: the farther away is the ￿rm, the higher is the level of underpricing. Such
regularity may deliver important policy implications. Given that ￿nancial centres are
usually located in a› uent areas, local disparities may be perpetuated or widened by
spatial di⁄erences in the cost of equity ￿nancing. This e⁄ect may further strengthen
in the future due to ￿nancial development and globalization to the extent that a
large share of ￿nancial activities tend to be concentrated in very few ￿nancial centres
worldwide.
Numerous studies have found that on average IPOs are underpriced: the share
of an issuing company is often o⁄ered to investors at a lower price than that which
will prevail shortly after public trading starts. Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001), for
instance, report evidence that underpricing occurs extensively in every country: on
average it amounts to more than 15% in countries with a developed ￿nancial system
and around 60% in emerging markets. Beatty and Ritter (1986) explain this regularity
in terms of the ex ante uncertainty regarding the value per share of an issuing ￿rm and
provide evidence consistent with this explanation. In particular, as the uncertainty
increases, the winner￿ s curse problem faced by a representative investor increases, and
thus the degree of underpricing has to increase too.1
Ample evidence is also available suggesting that most economic agents exhibit
a strong preference for proximity, the common explanation being the informational
advantage of nearness. This is mainly true for institutional and individual investors,
banks and ￿nancial analysts whose local choices tend to be rewarded with better out-
comes (e.g. Coval and Moskovitz, 2001). To a large extent, the value of proximity does
not seem to be a⁄ected by recent technological advances in the process of information
transmission: distance still inhibits ￿soft information￿and ￿tacit knowledge￿￿ ows
1Although underpricing is a common feature of IPOs, some issues decline in price once they start
being traded. Thus a potential investor submitting a purchase order is uncertain about the value of
the ￿rm that goes public, and in turn about the price that will prevail once the stocks start publicly
trading. Beatty and Ritter (1986) argue that the greater this ex ante uncertainty, or the less is
known about the share value, the greater is the expected underpricing. Thus, the latter re￿ ects
the strength of asymmetric information and may be interpreted as an indirect cost of raising equity
￿nance.
￿2 ￿since, by their nature, such kinds of information are not easily transferable across
space.2
Arguably, these two pieces of evidence would suggest a role of geography in explain-
ing underpricing. As a ￿rst instance, we note that underwriters ￿ who price share
issues ￿ and institutional investors are usually clustered within the ￿nancial centre
of a country. Also, proximity of investors to issuing companies appears to facilitate
the dissemination of important information through informal means. For instance,
conversations with employees and customers may help investors to gain important
information about the morale of the workers and prospects of the ￿rms (Loughran,
2007). Other things being equal, if proximity to an issuing ￿rm matters for obtaining
more accurate and less costly information about the ￿rm ￿ or equivalently if the cost
of information acquisition depends on distance ￿ then the estimated value of ￿rms
located far away from the underwriter is subject to greater uncertainty. Consistent
with Beatty and Ritter￿ s reasoning, this would suggest a negative relationship be-
tween the level of underpricing and the ￿rm￿ s distance from the underwriter. Indeed,
investors, especially institutional investors that play a key role in IPOs, should be
less inclined to buy or subscribe to stocks of ￿rms located far away unless they are
su¢ ciently underpriced. Similarly, the managing underwriter can encourage institu-
tional investors to collect information about the listing ￿rm and to participate in the
IPO if the issuing price is relatively low. Since a spatially centralized ￿nancial system
implies that institutional investors and underwriters are both located in the ￿nancial
centre of the country, the shares of more distant ￿rms from the ￿nancial centre should
be more underpriced.
Looking at France, Germany and Italy we provide evidence that the lower is
the proximity of an issuing ￿rm to the ￿nancial centre of its country the higher is
the di⁄erence between the o⁄er price and the ￿rst day average traded price. Such
evidence is robust to ￿rms￿characteristics and proxies for market return. Thus, our
results suggest that, by increasing the cost of raising equity ￿nance, distance from
￿nancial centres may provide an obstacle to the growth of relatively new and small
2Stein (2002) uses the term soft to describe the type of information that cannot be directly veri￿ed
by anyone other than the agent who produces it. Gertler (2003) uses the therm tacit for knowledge
that cannot be created successfully through exchange of information at distance, but necessitates
frequent face-to-face contact. In an IPO process for instance, beyond ￿nancial statements and plans
available in a codi￿ed form of spreadsheets or reports, the underwriter needs to know the integrity
and reputation of the issuer￿ s executives. Agnes (2000) found that the ￿nancial industry requires face-
to-face interaction (conferences, site visits, dinners and informal meetings, etc.) obviously facilitated
by spatial proximity.
￿3 ￿￿rms located in peripheral regions.3
Since the seminal paper by Beatty and Ritter (1986) ￿ who provide evidence that
underpricing is correlated with proxies of uncertainty based on prospectus disclosure
￿ various studies have tested the hypothesis that IPO underpricing is determined by
the ex ante uncertainty regarding the value of issuing ￿rm. In particular, according
to the assumption about the source of uncertainty di⁄erent explanatory variables for
underpricing have been exploited.4 For instance, by looking at issuing ￿rm character-
istics, Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) provide evidence consistent with the idea that
the larger and older the issuing ￿rm, the lower should be the level of underpricing,
as the ￿rm￿ s estimated value should be less noisy. As regards o⁄ering characteristics,
Habib and Ljungqvist (2001), instead, proxy uncertainty with the underwriting fee:
insofar as the risk borne by the underwriter increases with the level of uncertainty,
then the level of fee, which at least in part is due to compensate such risk, provides a
measure of uncertainty. Using a sample of US IPOs ￿ oated on Nasdaq between 1991
and 1995, the authors ￿nd empirical evidence supporting the previous argument.
Carter and Manaster (1990) as well as Megginson and Weiss (1991) con￿rm the role
of underwriter reputation in reducing the level of underpricing, giving credit to the
so-called ￿certi￿cation hypothesis￿ . The former use underwriters￿relative placements
in stock o⁄ering ￿tombstone￿announcements, while the latter rely on the relative
market share of the underwriters as a proxy for reputation.5 Benveniste et al. (2003)
￿nd evidence that underpricing is higher when the ￿rm value depends more greatly
on growth opportunities and other intangible assets. Finally, Schenone (2004) shows
that banking relationship ￿ between issuing ￿rms and underwriters ￿ mitigates the
asymmetric information problem and reduces the subsequent underpricing.6
3In general, the IPO process involves both direct and indirect costs of raising equity ￿nance.
Among the former, underwriting and audit fees, selling commission and legal expenses. Underpricing
instead is considered a large indirect cost (see, among others, Ritter, 1987 and Eckbo, 2008).
4Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001) summarize many of the studies that have looked at the relation-
ship between ex ante uncertainty and underpricing by grouping the proxies of uncertainty into ￿ve
categories: company characteristics, o⁄ering characteristics, (prospectus) disclosure, certi￿cation,
and after-market variables.
5As noted by Megginson and Weiss (1991) a comparison of the two measures of quality results in
a high degree of positive correlation.
6Di⁄erent explanations for IPO underpricing have been proposed in the literature. In the present
paper, we focus on the role of asymmetric information among players involved in the IPO process.
Alternative explanations rely on institutional factors (Ibbotson, 1975; Ruud, 1993; Schultz and Za-
man, 1994) or the separation between ownership and control (Brennan and Franks, 1997; Stoughton
￿4 ￿The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a selected review of past
empirical evidence on geography and ￿nance. In section 3 we present the data and the
empirical model. Sections 4 shows results for the three European countries considered,
while section 5 concludes with some policy implications.
2 A selected review about proximity and ￿nancial
decisions
Information asymmetry is the main factor which accounts for the role of geographic
proximity. Ample evidence has recently emerged suggesting that the choices of dif-
ferent types of ￿nancial operators dealing with a ￿rm are a⁄ected by its geographic
location, the common explanation being the informational advantage of proximity
possibly due to relatively easier access to value-relevant information about the ￿rm.
In particular, the geographic location of the ￿rm matters for potential investors, ￿-
nancial analysts, underwriters and investment banks.
As long as information regarding a ￿rm is costly and depends upon its location,
then investment choices by potential investors are driven by local bias. Empirical
evidence shows that such a bias exists in both international and domestic portfolio
selection, and that investment returns in local holdings are higher than those in non-
local holdings. French and Porterba (1991) state that most investors hold nearly all
of their wealth in domestic assets because they know less about foreign markets, insti-
tutions and ￿rms. Coval and Moskovitz (1999) ￿nd evidence of local bias in investors￿
choices also within the national ￿nancial market. They report that US investment
managers exhibit a strong preference for locally headquartered ￿rms. Asymmetric
information between local and non-local investors is the main reason for this pref-
erence for geographically proximate investment. Investors located near a ￿rm can
obtain valuable private information about a ￿rm by talking to employees, managers
and suppliers of the ￿rms, as well as through local media. These possibilities may
give them an information advantage in local stocks. Coval and Moskovits (2001) cor-
roborate the above ￿ndings: US mutual fund managers are more likely to buy and
hold stocks of ￿rms that are located closer to them as they earn signi￿cant abnormal
returns on geographically proximate investments.7 The information advantage is due
and Zechner, 1998).
7They measure the proximity in terms of physical distance between investors and the legal head-
￿5 ￿to the improved monitoring capabilities and to access to private information on local
companies.8
There is also a role of geography in facilitating governance activities and in improv-
ing target performance. Information advantage that arises from proximity induces a
strong preference of block acquires for geographically proximate targets (Kang and
Kim, 2008). A link emerges between geographic proximity and corporate governance:
geographically proximate block acquirers are more likely to engage in post-acquisition
governance activities in targets than are remote acquirers. Targets located near
acquirers experience both higher abnormal announcement returns and better post-
acquisition operating performance than remote targets. If distance increases informa-
tion asymmetries about managerial investment decisions, investors of remotely located
￿rms will demand higher dividends.9 John et al. (2008) provide evidence that cen-
trally located ￿rms pay lower dividends, make more dividend cuts, and replace regular
dividends with shares.
Pirinsky and Wang (2006) argue that the physical proximity of investors also
enables social interaction that promotes the transmission of investment sentiment
and information among members of a community. Such local exchange, together with
the geographic segmentation of domestic capital markets, may explain the evidence of
strong comovement in the stock returns of ￿rms headquartered in the same geographic
area.
Malloy (2005) and Bae et al. (2008) show that the accuracy of forecasts and rec-
ommendations provided by analysts geographically proximate to the ￿rms are more
accurate than those of distant analysts. The result is consistent with the hypothesis
that geographically proximate analysts possess an information advantage. In particu-
lar, Malloy argues that the possibility of local analysts having personal ties with CEOs
and monitoring the ￿rm￿ s operations directly provide them with private information.
Loughran (2008) shows that rural ￿rms are less likely than urban ones to raise eq-
uity ￿nancing through public o⁄erings. Since investors tend to hold stocks in familiar
quarters of the ￿rms.
8Decisions of individual investors also are a⁄ected by proximity, the latter leading to familiarity
with the ￿rm (Huberman, 2001; Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001; Ivkovic and Weisbenner, 2005; Zhu,
2002).
9Pirinsky and Wang (2010) review the importance of geographic location for corporate gover-
nance within the context of four theoretical frameworks ￿agency theory of the ￿rm, asymmetric
information, market segmentation, and behavioral ￿nance.
￿6 ￿companies and geographical distance from a company reduces familiarity, then rural
￿rms have fewer investors inclined to subscribe to new shares because relatively few
investors are located near rural ￿rms. This e⁄ect holds not only for the individual in-
vestors but also for the investment bankers that could participate in the IPO process.
If the investment bankers are located farther from the issuing ￿rm they are less fa-
miliar with the rural company and the due diligence required for an equity o⁄ering
will be more costly.10 Furthermore, according to Loughran and Schultz (2005) rural
stocks attract less analyst coverage than urban ones, trade much less and trading
costs for Nasdaq stocks are higher for companies located in rural areas. Finally, rural
￿rms are less liquid than their urban counterparts and this could increase the cost of
capital. The latter result is also found by Francis et al. (2008) who show that ￿rms in
rural areas experience higher costs of capital because investors have greater di¢ culty
in monitoring their activities.
Porteous (1999) suggests that in a spatially centralized system with a single ￿-
nancial centre asymmetric information, costly information and uncertainty may be a
function of the physical distance between ￿rms seeking ￿nance and institutions pro-
viding ￿nance. Thus whether the ￿nancial system is centralized or decentralized may
have consequences on the ability of ￿rms located in the peripheral regions to raise
equity capital and its relative cost. Klagge and Martin (2005) argue that a single
￿nancial centre containing the main ￿nancial institutions and capital markets could
result in funds being biased (or less costly) towards those ￿rms within close proximity
to the ￿nancial centre, relative to more distant ￿rms, given that the information on
the former is likely to be greater and more reliable than on the latter. Wojcik (2009)
shows that provincial ￿rms are less likely to go public than ￿rms located in ￿nancial
centres. The author explains this phenomenon, that he calls ￿￿nancial centre bias￿ ,
with the tacit knowledge involved in the IPO process, with access to specialised labour
market provided by the ￿nancial centres, and with the principal-agent problem that
occurs when the owners are distinct from the managers. With respect to the lat-
ter explanation, Wojcik argues that geographic proximity between the principal and
the agent could alleviate the agency problem as a result of better monitoring and
relationship building.
10Corwin and Schultz (2005) demonstrate that geography is a signi￿cant determinant of syndicate
participation in an IPO. US underwriters are more likely to be included in a syndicate if they are
in the same state as the issuer. Underwriters in a neighbouring state are less likely to be included
in the syndicate than underwriters based in the same state but more likely than underwriters based
elsewhere.
￿7 ￿3 Data sources and de￿nitions of main variables
A ￿nancial centre is usually identi￿ed with a city or a localized area within city
boundaries in which high ￿nancial level functions and services are concentrated (for
instance, Wall Street in New York and the City in London). It includes activities of
commercial banking, investment banking, insurance and a stock exchange. In this
paper, we identify the ￿nancial centre of each country considered as the city where
the main stock exchange of the country is located. Since ￿nancial intermediaries tend
to establish their location close to the stock exchange and the services provided by the
stock exchange are crucial in the case of IPOs, our de￿nition seems to be appropriate
for the matter in hand.
Our criteria point to the cities of Milan and Paris as the two ￿nancial centres
of, respectively, Italy and France. The headquarters of the most important banks
and almost all ￿nancial operators and institutional investors are headquartered in
Milan, which has the only Italian stock exchange. The case of France is similar. Our
choice proves consistent with the Global Financial Centres Classi￿cation (GFCC),
which reports Paris as the only ￿nancial centre in France, ranked 20th worldwide,
and Milan and Rome as the two Italian ￿nancial centres. Rome, however, enters the
GFCC only because almost all state-run enterprises are headquartered there.
Unlike from France and Italy, six cities in Germany have stock exchanges; two of
them, Frankfurt and Munich, are indicated as ￿nancial centres by the GFCC. For the
purpose of our investigation we identify the German ￿nancial centre with the city of
Frankfurt: the Frankfurt Stock Exchange is by far the largest of Germany￿ s six stock
exchanges in terms of turnover ￿ roughly 90% of total turnover is concentrated in the
Frankfurt Stock Exchange ￿ and it is one of the largest stock exchange in the world.
Hence, our choice seems consistent with the idea of a national ￿nancial centre.11
Following the recent empirical literature, we de￿ne a ￿rm￿ s location as the location
of a ￿rm￿ s headquarters. Corporate headquarters are usually close to corporate core
11There are four more cities with their own stock exchange and a number of regional banks, that is
Berlin, Hamburg, Dusseldorf and Stuttgart. In recent years, however, the German ￿nancial system
has witnessed a concentration of activities in the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. In reaction to this
process the regional stock exchanges have pursued niche strategies in market segments neglected
by Frankfurt. For instance, the Berlin Stock Exchange has a strong focus on secondary listing of
foreign companies, such as US or Chinese companies, and the Hamburg Stock Exchange focuses on
new business areas such as the start-up market of young companies. In principle, the presence of
regional ￿nancial centres might mitigate the market imperfections and reduce the strength of the
investigated relationship.
￿8 ￿business activity, especially for small ￿rms. Moreover, and more important, this is the
place where corporate decisions are made and is the centre of information exchange
and information production. Thus, the ￿rm￿ s distance from the ￿nancial centre,
namely Distance, is measured as the physical distance, in kilometres, between the
legal headquarter of a listing ￿rm and the ￿nancial centre of the country where the
￿rm is located. This is our proxy for the ex-ante uncertainty and it is the main
explanatory variable of the empirical investigation.12
Given the de￿nitions of country ￿nancial centre and ￿rm￿ s location, Figure 1 shows
the regional distribution of the number of IPOs (per capita) in Germany, France and
Italy and also indicates the regions where the three stock exchanges are located. We
consider all IPOs ￿ for which data on size and age of the issuing ￿rms are available
￿ that took place on the Frankfurter Wertpapierb￿rse, Bourse de Paris, and Borsa
Italia (Mercato Telematico Azionario, MTA) from 1996 for France and Italy, and 1997
for Germany up to 2009. IPOs related to foreign ￿rms as well as national ￿rms with
their own headquarters in a foreign country are excluded from the sample.13
In terms of distance from the ￿nancial centre, German ￿rms going public in our
sample are dispersed throughout the country quite symmetrically. The average and
median distances are, respectively, 308 and 313 kilometres with an index of skewness
of the Distance distribution which equals ￿0:2. All 16 regions have one or more ￿rms
going public. Conversely, both in France and Italy the variable Distance is positive
skewed (with an asymmetric index greater than 1), with mean (median) values of
200 kilometres (16 kilometres) and 199 kilometres (145 kilometres), respectively. As
regards France, the positive skew is explained as more than 50% of the companies
that go public are headquartered in the city of Paris. In Italy ￿rms going public are
concentrated in 13 out of 20 regions, while in France they are distributed across all
regions except for Corsica.
The dependent variable of the empirical analysis, namely Underpricing, is com-
12As a robustness check, we have also calculated the distance in terms of the time required to
cover the physical distance. However, since the correlation coe¢ cient between the two measures is
very high, that is 0.84, results relative to underpricing and distance are very similar. Thus, in the
following we just report those based on physical distance.
13The Borsa Italia is divided into three markets, that is the main board (MTA) and two markets
for, respectively, small caps ￿ mainly cooperative banks and local utility ￿rms ￿ and small ￿rms
with high growth potential. In general, however, di⁄erent regulatory procedures apply in the last
two markets and shares of listed ￿rms are scarcely traded. Hence, we do not include them in our
sample.














where P is the closing price for the ￿rst day of trading and S is the subscription price.
The sources of the data are Nyse-Euronext, Deutsche B￿rse Group and Borsa Italia.
See the appendix for further details.
We have also computed market-adjusted underpricing as the di⁄erence between
Underpricing and the change in the market index during the ￿rst day of trading.
However, as concerns the relationship with Distance, the results are qualitatively the
same as those considering Underpricing.
Table 1: Underpricing, summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
France 13.367 69.22 -42.41 858.28 565
Germany 38.646 77.802 -21.2 790.99 438
Italy 11.957 42.264 -13.79 532.6 208
Table 1 shows Underpricing for France and Italian ￿rms is on average very similar
(about 12-13%), a value which is one third of that in Germany. The sample distri-
bution of Underpricing in France, however, has a much higher variability than that
￿10 ￿found in Italian ￿rms; the standard deviation of Underpricing in France is similar
to the corresponding value in Germany. Moreover, from other results (not reported)
it also emerges that underpricing is a persistent phenomenon throughout the entire
period analyzed. Despite some negative values, for each country the average of Under-
pricing is indeed greater than zero for all years considered, although it has decreased
in recent years.
A simple inspection of the data reveals that a linear relationship between Under-
pricing and Distance, calculated for the entire sample, does not ￿t the data appro-
priately, as a relatively low number of ￿rms share values of Underpricing very much
higher than those in the rest of the sample. Table 1 reports, for instance, that the
maximum value of Underpricing for Italian ￿rms is ￿fty times larger than the average
value. A similar conclusion applies to France and Germany. Since there is no sound
explanation for the characteristics of the data in question, we follow two di⁄erent ap-
proaches. By interpreting the extreme values as the signal of a non-linear relationship
between the two variables of interest we regress Underpricing on Distance and its
square, Distance2. Alternatively, we assume that a linear regression provides a satis-
factory way to model the data, after dropping those observations identi￿ed as severe
outliers through a standard statistical procedure. In particular, we rely on Hamilton
(1992) and consider an observation x as a severe outlier if
x < Q(25) ￿ 3 ￿ IQR or x > Q(75) + 3 ￿ IQR
where Q(25) is the 25th percentile, Q(75) is the 75th percentile, and IQR is the
interquartile range (that is, the value of the 75th percentile less that of the 25th
percentile).14
3.1 The estimated equation
Firm￿ s size and age have previously been interpreted as proxies for investors￿ex-ante
uncertainty. For instance, Leland and Pyle (1977) and Ritter (1986) argue that it
is a di¢ cult task to estimate the value of young and small ￿rms correctly; hence,
valuation of their shares is a⁄ected by high uncertainty. To control for these two
potential determinants of underpricing we include in the set of regressors the value of
14It is usual to distinguish between mild and severe outliers. However, mild outliers appear common
in samples of any size and thus we do not exclude them from our sample. We instead exclude the
severe outliers because they lie far out enough to have a substantial e⁄ect on means, standard
deviations and other classical statistics.
￿11 ￿total asset in the year before the IPO (expressed as million of Euros), namely Size,
and the di⁄erence between the year of listing and the year of establishment, namely
Age. The larger and older the ￿rm, the lower should be the uncertainty about its true
value; thus for both variables we expect a negative correlation with Underpricing.
Table 2: Age and Size, summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
France-Age 14.968 19.734 1 150 565
Germany-Age 18.861 28.539 1 217 438
Italy-Age 28.62 33.144 1 263 208
France-Size 767.972 7507.627 0.168 127424.43 565
Germany-Size 521.596 7381.394 0.049 154134.172 438
Italy-Size 1169.471 7277.488 0.700 91790.180 208
Table 2 reports some descriptive statistics on characteristics of the issuers. On
average and in terms of the median, Italian ￿rms are the oldest and largest in the
sample; the mean age is 28 years. French and German ￿rms show quite similar values
for the mean and standard deviation of the size, while age values in Germany appear
more dispersed around the mean than in France.
Pagano et al. (1998) note signi￿cant di⁄erences in those factors underlying the
decision to go public taken by privatization IPOs (PIPOs), equity carve-outs (ECOs)
￿ a case arising when the issuing ￿rm belongs to a group the holding company of
which is already listed ￿ and independent IPOs. As concerns the present paper,
the most relevant di⁄erence is that PIPOs and ECOs are less risky than independent
IPOs (see, for instance, Jenkinson and Ljungqvist, 2001) and thus they should be
characterized by a lower level of underpricing. Two dummies identifying such IPOs
control for this potential systematic di⁄erence.
In our sample issuing ￿rms are distributed among Industry, Non-Financial Ser-
vices, and Financial Services sectors. In particular, ￿nancial ￿rms account for 10%
of the total sample; industrial ￿rms instead are roughly 70% of the sample in France
and Germany and about 50% in Italy. We take into account that the level of under-
pricing may be sector-speci￿c by adding two dummies identifying ￿rms operating in
the Non-Financial Services and Industry sectors. For Italian IPOs the source is Borsa
Italia, while for French and German IPOs the source is Universoft.
￿12 ￿While all Italian IPOs and almost all IPOs in Germany use the book-building
procedure, about one third of French IPOs in our sample follow di⁄erent procedures.
Previous empirical work has shown that, other things being equal, the ￿ oating mecha-
nism may a⁄ect the level of underpricing.15 Derrien and Womack (2003), for instance,
￿nd that in France the auction mechanism is associated with less underpricing. In
order to control for such a possibility, we introduce a dummy which identi￿es French
IPOs following the book-building procedure.
During a bullish market phase, investors often tend to upgrade estimations of
￿rm values; conversely, during periods of high market volatility investors tend to
be more careful in valuing the IPOs. Of course, these explanations of underpricing
might be relevant in a time series context. By contrast, in a as cross-sectional context
they should a⁄ect the level of underpricing homogeneously, similarly to an aggregate
shock. Since we exploit a panel data set, if in a given year, for instance, the market
volatility is relatively high and most issuing ￿rms happen to be clustered far from
(or near to) the ￿nancial centre, a spurious correlation between Underpricing and
Distance may arise. However, the time-￿xed e⁄ect provides a way to control for
this outcome, mainly if the impact on underpricing tends to be exhausted within a
calendar year. To further handle such a possibility, we expand the set of regressors
with the variables Return and Volatility. The former is the percentage change of the
market index through the 20 working days before the listing day, while the latter
is the standard deviation of the market index during the 60 working days before it.
High market volatility in the period before the issue may induce investors to forecast
high volatility for the closing prices of the ￿rst few days of trading just after the IPO.
Similarly, an increase in the market index before the ￿rst days of trading may lead
operators to expect that the positive trend will persist; hence, they tend to upgrade
the estimation of ￿rm value. Under these circumstances a positive correlation should
emerge between either Volatility or Return and Underpricing.16 The market indices
considered for constructing the two variables are the Mib30 for Italy, the CAC40 for
France and the DAX30 for Germany.
15Kutsuna and Smith (2001) argue that the bookbuilding method allows issuers to reveal their
quality credibly to investors ￿ and to obtain a higher price for their shares ￿ but also entails a
revelation cost, inducing higher underpricing.
16As regards Italy, these variables have also been considered by Cassia et al. (2004) who indeed
￿nd a positive coe¢ cient for Return and a negative coe¢ cient for Volatility.
￿13 ￿The estimated equation without severe outliers is
Underpricingi;t = b0 + b1Distancei;t + ￿CONTROLSi;t + ￿t + "i;t (1)
where Distance is the (natural logarithm of) physical distance, in kilometres, be-
tween the legal headquarter of a listing ￿rm and the ￿nancial centre of the country,
CONTROLS contains the control variables discussed before (hence ￿ is a vector of
parameters) and ￿t is time ￿xed e⁄ect to control for aggregate cyclical variations of
the stock markets. Distance2 is added to equation (1) when the entire sample is
considered and the assumption of nonlinearity is investigated. We expect b1 > 0: the
greater is the distance between the issuing ￿rm and the ￿nancial centre, the higher is
the level of underpricing. As regards inference, we rely on standard errors robust to
heteroskedasticity and spatial correlation within regions.
4 Results
For France and Germany, we ￿nd a clear positive relationship between Underpricing
and Distance when equation 1 is estimated either without the severe outliers or with
Distance2 added as explanatory variable. The coe¢ cient b1 is estimated positive and
statistically signi￿cant at the usual con￿dence level (see Table 3). When Distance2
is also allowed its coe¢ cient is estimated negative but not statistically signi￿cant.
Looking at Italy, we ￿nd a positive and statistically signi￿cant value for b1 when 6
out of 208 observations are dropped from the sample. Conversely, when the entire
sample is considered and Distance2 is part of the set of regressors neither b1 nor b2
is statistically di⁄erent from zero. Thus, in this case it seems reasonable to inter-
pret the extreme observations as severe outliers. Overall, our evidence supports the
presumption that the level of underpricing tends to increase with the ￿rm￿ s distance
from the ￿nancial centre. In particular, when the severe outliers are dropped the
point estimates suggest a very similar marginal e⁄ect of Distance on Underpricing for
France and Italy, and that this e⁄ect is much lower than that estimated for Germany.
Our main conclusion is robust to a large number of controls (see Table 4). In
general, the model that excludes the severe outliers seems more appropriate to ￿t the
relationship between the variables of interest. As before, the coe¢ cient of Distance
is positive and statistically signi￿cant for the three countries considered. The point
estimate of b1 for Germany is not a⁄ected at all by the introduction of the controls,
while that relative to France (Italy) decreases from 0.43 to 0.32 (increases from 0.39
￿14 ￿to 0.71).
As regards the coe¢ cients of the various controls we note that in general they
have the expected sign, but they are not always statistically signi￿cant at the usual
con￿dence level. Sectoral dummies, for instance, are not signi￿cant. The negative
relation between Underpricing and both Size and Age suggests that small and young
￿rms face a higher level of underpricing than large and old ￿rms, due to the uncertainty
about their true value. When the market is bullish, investors, at least in Germany,
tend to upgrade the estimations of ￿rm value and this positively a⁄ects the ￿rst day
price of issued stocks. A similar result is found by Coakley et al. (2009) looking at the
IPOs issued on the London Stock Exchange between 1985 and 2003. A positive e⁄ect
of market volatility on the level of underpricing emerges in Germany and Italy. Finally,
at least for France, our results con￿rm that PIPOs are less risky than independent
IPOs; we do not detect, instead, any signi￿cant e⁄ect for the dummy identifying the
Carve-Out.
4.1 Further results for Italy
In this section we present further results relative to Italy, by extending the set of
controls with three variables for the o⁄ering characteristics and two variables related
to the book-building procedure. In particular, we allow for the ratio between the
number of shares dedicated to the greenshoe option and the total number of shares
sold in the IPO, Greenshoe. In order to support the share price during the ￿rst days
of trading, over-allotment and greenshoe options are exploited in almost all Italian
IPOs. The overallotment option refers to the practice of allocating a greater number
of shares than the advertised deal size. When the stocks start trading, the underwriter
can buy shares at the IPO price from the issuer using the greenshoe option. Jenkinson
and Jones (2007) point out that this procedure prevents a decline in price once stocks
start trading; Benveniste and Spindt (1989) further argue that the greenshoe option
reduces the risk of the issue, its uncertainty and the expected underpricing. Moreover,
we also consider a measure of the width of the ￿ling price range which proxies for the
level of uncertainty at the beginning of the IPO process, Range; a dummy variable
picking underwriters with high reputation in the capital market, Reputation.17
Since all the Italian IPOs investigated rely on the book-building procedure, we
17The dummy to model underwriter reputation is consistent with the approach suggested by
Megginson and Weiss (1991). See the appendix for details.
￿15 ￿further extend the set of explanatory variables by allowing for Revision and Over-
subscription. The former measures the revision of the issue price relative to the
average value of the price range; it is a proxy for the amount of information that
the underwriter has gathered during the roadshow. Cornelli and Goldreich (2003)
and Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2002) show that issues with a positive revision in the
o⁄er price tend to be more underpriced. Oversubscription is the ratio between the
number of institutional investors that have requested the shares and the number of
institutional investors that get them. When the demand for shares during the IPO
process is relatively high, many investors do not obtain the shares and thus they will
try to buy them in the aftermarket. This will a⁄ect positively the ￿rst day price of
the shares and hence the extent of underpricing. Finally, we also control for the fees
paid by the issuing ￿rms to the underwriter with the variable Fees.
The results are reported in Table 5. Note that since adding the new controls to
equation 1 reduces the sample, as a matter of comparison we also show (under the
heading R1) the results without the new controls but with the reduced sample. Under
the heading R2 we just introduce the variables Reputation, Greenshoe and Range,
while the following two columns of the table also consider the variable Revision,
Oversubscription and Fee. In general, empirical evidence provides further support to
our hypothesis that more distant ￿rms from the ￿nancial centre experience higher
underpricing. As regards the new controls, note that a strong signi￿cance for the
coe¢ cient of Range, which is estimated positive, is reported in the table under the
heading R2. However, the t-ratio and the point estimate of this coe¢ cient are much
reduced when the variable Revision is also considered (see results under the headings
R3 and R4). The dummy for the underwriter￿ s reputation is signi￿cant with a negative
sign as suggested by the ￿Certi￿cation Hypothesis￿ . Lastly, the coe¢ cient of Fee,
although not signi￿cant, has a positive sign, excluding that high underpricing ￿
hence, indirect cost of going public ￿ is compensated by a low level of the direct cost
of going public.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have provided evidence in favour of a new explanation of IPOs under-
pricing in terms of the physical distance between the issuing ￿rms and the ￿nancial
centre of a country. There is ample empirical evidence to suggest that economic agents
exhibit a strong local bias, the common explanation being the informational advan-
￿16 ￿tage of nearness. Arguably, nearness should also matter during the IPO process: the
informational advantage of nearness implies that peripheral ￿rms with respect to un-
derwriters and institutional investors should be subject to higher ex-ante uncertainty
and thus higher underpricing. Data for France, Germany and Italy corroborate this
prediction.
If we consider the size of underpricing as the main indirect ￿ otation cost, then
since IPO underwriters are usually clustered within the ￿nancial centre of a country,
our evidence implies that peripheral ￿rms with respect to the ￿nancial centre share a
larger cost of equity ￿nancing than other ￿rms. This is mainly true for new and small
￿rms that operate in peripheral regions. Moreover, as ￿rms in such regions tend to face
constraints in the supply of funds from major banks, our results suggest that distance
from the ￿nancial centre may increase the cost of going public and be an obstacle to
the ￿rms growth. In the future, peripheral ￿rms may be further disadvantaged due
to the increased concentration of ￿nancial services in very few areas worldwide.
It emerged from our analysis that geography matters due to asymmetric informa-
tion and the informational advantage of nearness. A possible way to counteract the
negative e⁄ect of distance on the cost of equity ￿nancing could be to create regional
branches of a country￿ s stock exchange that are well connected to the ￿nancial centre.
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￿21 ￿Data appendix
For each country considered, our sample includes IPOs of domestic ￿rms that take
place on the Italian Stock Exchange (Borsa Italia), the French Stock Exchange (Paris
Bourse), and Frankfurt Stock Exchange. IPOs related to foreign ￿rms as well as
to national ￿rms with their own headquarters in a foreign country do not enter our
sample. Splits from already listed companies, transfers between market segments and
direct listings are not considered IPOs. In general, we consider all IPOs for which the
variables Underpricing, Age and Size are available.
On 22 September 2000, the bourses in Paris, Amsterdam and Brussels merged to
create Euronext, the ￿rst pan-European stock exchange. Since then we assigned to
France the ￿ otations of French companies that select Paris as their point of access to
Euronext (this determines the applicable legislation and regulatory jurisdiction). The
sample period starts in 1996 for French and Italian IPOs, one year later for German
ones.
Data for French and German IPOs comes from the EurIPO database, which pro-
vides information about IPOs related to the most important international stock ex-
changes. Data for the Italian IPOs instead comes from the Yearbooks of Borsa Italia,
the prospectus of listing ￿rms and information available on the web sites of various
￿rms.
Underpricing, is computed as follows: [(P ￿ S)=S] ￿ 100 where P is the closing
price for the ￿rst day of trading and S is the subscription price.
Distance is the physical distance in kilometers between the ￿nancial centre of
Milan, Paris or Frankfurt and the headquarter of the listing ￿rm.
Size is the total asset (in euro) in the year before the IPO. Data for Italian IPOs
are collected from the prospectus of listing ￿rms while for German and French IPOs
the source is Universoft.
Age is the di⁄erence between the year of IPO and the year of establishment. The
sources of data are the prospectus of listing ￿rms for Italian IPOs and Universoft for
French and German IPOs.
Index Return is the percentage change of the market index in the 20 working days
before the ￿rst day of trading. The market index are Mib30, Cac40 and Dax. The
source of data is Freestocks, an o¢ cial provider of stock market data.
￿22 ￿Index Volatility is the standard deviation of the market index in the 60 working
days before the ￿rst day of trading. The market index are Mib30, Cac40 and Dax.
The source of data is Freestocks, an o¢ cial provider of stock market data.
Revision refers to the percentage change of the IPO price with respect to
the preliminary book-building price range. The variable is computed as follows:
(PIPO ￿ Pmin)=(Pmax ￿ Pmin), where PIPO is the ￿nal o⁄er price of the stocks, Pmin is
the bottom price and Pmax is the top price of the bookbuilding range. Source: Borsa
Italia.
Reputation is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the underwriter has a good
reputation on the capital market and 0 otherwise. For each underwriter we calculate
two market shares, based respectively on the total amount of euros brought to market
and the total number of IPOs managed. Then we calculate the average of the two
market shares and generate a dummy variable that equals 1 if the underwriter is
ranked in the top positions. With respect to the proxy used by Megginson and Weiss
(1991), that accounts only for the euro amount brought to market, our proxy also
accounts for the number of IPOs. Underwriters indeed increase their own reputation
on capital markets not only by participating in large IPOs but also by participating
in several IPOs.
Greenshoe is the ratio between the number of shares dedicated to the greenshoe
option and the total number of shares sold through the IPO. Source: Borsa Italia.
Oversubscription is the ratio between the number of institutional investors that
have requested the shares and the number of institutional investors that e⁄ectively
get the shares. Source: Borsa Italia.
Range measures the width of the ￿ling price range computed as follows:
[(Pmax ￿ Pmin)=Pmin] ￿ 100. Source: Borsa Italia.
Fee represents the fees paid by the issuer to the underwriter in percentage of the
IPO proceeds. Source: Borsa Italia.
￿23 ￿Table 3: Underpricing and Distance
France Germany Italy France Germany Italy
Distance 5.57 14.76￿ -10.09 0.43￿￿￿ 4.40￿￿ 0.39￿
[2.02] [2.37] [-0.70] [4.36] [3.33] [2.12]
Distance2 -0.64 -1.75 1.68
[-1.45] [-2.01] [0.74]
N 565 438 208 541 411 202
R2 0.142 0.089 0.073 0.037 0.133 0.091
Data are at region level and annual from 1996 (1997) for France
and Italy (Germany) up to 2009. The dependent variable is the
di⁄erence between the closing price for the ￿rst day of trading and
the subscription price, expressed as percentage of the latter. All
estimated equations contain on the right-hand side year dummies
(not reported) The t-statistic is reported in squared brackets; *
p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors are clustered
at the region level.
￿24 ￿Table 4: Underpricing and Distance with Controls
France Germany Italy France Germany Italy
Distance 5.29 16.31￿ -12.59 0.32￿￿ 4.32￿￿￿ 0.71￿
[1.81] [2.85] [-0.87] [2.90] [4.37] [2.59]
Distance2 -0.48 -1.81￿ 2.25
[-1.05] [-2.45] [0.95]
Age -0.14￿ -0.27￿￿￿ -0.12￿￿ 0.04 -0.20￿￿￿ -0.08￿￿￿
[-2.55] [-4.60] [-3.19] [1.61] [-5.11] [-5.32]
Size 0.00￿ -0.00￿ -0.00 -0.00￿ -0.00￿￿￿ -0.00
[2.14] [-2.83] [-1.20] [-2.49] [-6.25] [-1.42]
Return 0.08 1.66￿ 1.65 0.07 1.22￿ 0.09
[0.14] [2.62] [1.19] [1.06] [2.91] [0.62]
Volatility 0.01 0.21￿￿￿ 0.02￿￿￿ -0.01 0.08￿ 0.01￿￿
[0.48] [5.96] [5.32] [-1.13] [2.79] [4.19]
Non_Financial_Service -1.29 22.08 8.08 -0.42 5.74 -2.90
[-0.26] [1.44] [0.79] [-0.88] [1.58] [-1.11]
Industry -3.48 -2.35 -6.82 0.93 4.90 -3.95
[-0.99] [-0.35] [-1.72] [1.89] [1.19] [-1.87]
Privatization_IPOs -6.85 -14.06 -13.56 -4.09￿￿ 7.09 4.11
[-1.74] [-2.06] [-1.04] [-3.26] [1.44] [1.05]
Carve_Out 4.05 -22.51 -12.13 0.59 -9.47 -5.49
[1.79] [-2.11] [-1.79] [0.57] [-1.85] [-1.97]
Book_building 23.64￿￿ -2.50
[3.35] [-2.05]
N 565 438 208 541 411 202
R2 0.165 0.185 0.196 0.066 0.218 0.187
Data are at region level and annual from 1996 (1997) for France and Italy
(Germany) up to 2009. The dependent variable is the di⁄erence between the
closing price for the ￿rst day of trading and the subscription price, expressed as
percentage of the latter. All estimated equations contain on the right-hand side
year dummies (not reported) The t-statistic is reported in squared brackets; *
p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors are clustered at the region
level.
￿25 ￿Table 5: Underpricing and Distance in Italy: Further Results
R1 R2 R3 R4
Distance 1.179￿ 1.017￿ 1.286￿￿ 1.394￿￿
[2.72] [2.34] [3.37] [3.58]
Age -0.0668￿￿ -0.0674￿￿ -0.0690￿ -0.0623￿
[-4.06] [-3.32] [-2.49] [-3.01]
Size -0.000157 -0.000157 -0.000218 -0.000188
[-1.59] [-1.52] [-1.62] [-1.35]
Return -0.0242 0.100 0.158 0.172
[-0.12] [0.65] [1.24] [1.18]
Volatility 0.00692￿￿ 0.00343 0.00329 0.00400
[3.90] [1.34] [1.36] [1.50]
Non Financial Service -3.799 -3.373 -2.937 -3.239
[-1.58] [-1.32] [-1.04] [-1.36]
Industry -6.366￿ -5.073 -5.709￿ -6.050￿
[-2.44] [-1.64] [-2.43] [-2.68]
Privatization IPOs 3.073 4.776 1.463 4.009
[0.74] [1.26] [0.37] [1.03]
Carve Out -5.904 -4.960 -5.972 -4.988
[-1.88] [-1.60] [-1.89] [-1.64]
Greenshoe -0.0716 -0.113 -0.165
[-0.50] [-0.89] [-1.33]
Range 0.0570￿￿￿ 0.0362￿ 0.0302￿
[7.37] [2.79] [2.21]








Observations 160 165 164 160
R2 0.204 0.229 0.344 0.366
Data are at region level and annual from 1999 up to 2009. The dependent
variable is the di⁄erence between the closing price for the ￿rst day of
trading and the subscription price, expressed as percentage of the latter.
All estimated equations also contain on the right-hand side year dummies
(not reported) The t-statistic is reported in squared brackets; * p<0.05,
** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors are clustered at the region
level.
￿26 ￿